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Edelstein v. Bank of New York Mellon, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 48 (September 27, 2012)1
NEVADA FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM
Summary
Appeal examining the note-holder and beneficial-interest status of a party seeking to
foreclose via the Nevada Foreclosure Mediation Program (Nevada FMP).
Disposition/Outcome
In order to participate in the Nevada FMP and obtain the necessary Nevada FMP
certificate to proceed with the nonjudicial foreclosure of an owner-occupied residence, the party
seeking foreclosure must show he is both the beneficiary of the deed of trust as well as the
current holder of the promissory note.
If the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (MERS) is designated as the initial
beneficiary of the deed of trust, that designation does not irreversibly split the promissory note
and the deed of trust so as to prevent foreclosure. If MERS is the designated beneficiary and a
different entity holds the note, the note and the deed of trust are split, thereby making nonjudicial
foreclosure by either entity improper. But, such a split is cured if the promissory note and deed
of trust are reunified in one entity.
Facts/Procedural History
Appellant David Edelstein executed a promissory note (the note) in 2006 through lender
and note-holder New American Funding, which provided Edelstein with a home loan. The note
stated that the Lender may transfer the note, and that the Lender or anyone who takes the note by
transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under this note is called the “Note Holder.”
Edelstein and New American Funding also executed a deed of trust to secure the note,
which named New American Funding as the lender, Chicago Title as the trustee, and MERS as
the beneficiary. Specifically, the deed of trust described MERS as a separate corporation that was
acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns. It also described
MERS as the beneficiary under this Security Instrument, and later described MERS as the
beneficiary of this Security Instrument (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors
and assigns) and the successors and assigns of MERS. The deed of trust also stated that
"[b]orrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the Interests granted by
Borrower in this Security Instrument," but that "MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender's
successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not
limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to take any action required of Lender .
..."
Subsequently, both the note and the deed of trust were transferred several times. With the
note, New American Funding created an allonge endorsing the note to the order of Countrywide
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Bank. Countrywide Bank then endorsed the note to the order of Countrywide Horne Loans, Inc.,
which in turn endorsed the note in blank, as follows: "Pay to the order of __ Without Recourse."
The deed of trust was also conveyed when MERS granted, assigned, and transferred "all
beneficial interest" under the deed of trust to respondent Bank of New York Mellon (BNY
Mellon); the conveyance language on the assignment stated that it was assigned and transferred
together with the note . BNY Mellon designated ReconTrust Company as its new trustee,
replacing Chicago Title. At the time of the mediation, ReconTrust physically possessed (1) the
note, which was endorsed in blank, and (2) an assignment of the deed of trust, which named
BNY Mellon as the beneficiary.
Edelstein stopped paying on the note and thus received a notice of default and election to
sell. Edelstein elected to participate in the Nevada FMP. At the July 2010 foreclosure mediation,
there was no resolution of the foreclosure issue. The mediator filed a report determining that
"[t]he parties participated but were unable to agree to a loan modification or make other
arrangements." The Court noted that the mediator did not report that the beneficiary or its
representatives failed to attend the mediation, failed to participate in good faith, failed to bring
required documents to the mediation, or failed to have authority to mediate.
On August 5, 2010, Edelstein filed a petition for judicial review with the district court,
seeking a determination that BNY Mellon had participated in the mediation in bad faith. He
argued that BNY Mellon failed to provide sufficient documents concerning the assignment of the
mortgage note, deed of trust, and interest in the trust, and an appraisal or broker's price opinion.
He further argued that BNY Mellon did not have the authority or access to a person with the
authority to modify the loan as required by NRS 107.086 because the person representing BNY
Mellon was not available to fully negotiate in good faith, and did not provide sufficient
documentation that BNY Mellon held a legal claim to the beneficial proceeds of the deed.
Finally, he argued that BNY Mellon failed to offer any modification offers. Bank of America (on
behalf of BNY Mellon) objected to each of Edelstein's arguments and also argued that
Edelstein's petition should not be considered because it was untimely. Edelstein argued that
because the allonge was an invalid assignment, BNY Mellon was legally required to show that it
owned those rights, or it had no legal authority to be attempting any foreclosure of the Edelstein
home." He also contended that MERS' assignment of the deed of trust was invalid because
MERS was a "sham" beneficiary. Lastly, Edelstein argued that his petition for judicial review
was timely filed.
Before the district court, Edelstein emphasized that BNY Mellon had no standing in the
matter because there was no chain of title that came from New American Funding to the acting
party, BNY Mellon. The district court issued two separate orders. In the first order, the district
court found that Edelstein timely filed his petition for judicial review and that BNY Mellon had
properly appeared at the mediation. In its second order, the court found that BNY Mellon did not
participate in bad faith, that the parties agreed to negotiate further, and that absent a timely
appeal, a Letter of Certification would issue. Edelstein appealed.

Discussion
Justice Hardesty wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court sitting en banc. The primary
issue before the Court was whether BNY Mellon could properly participate in the Nevada FMP
and obtain a Nevada FMP certificate to proceed with foreclosure proceedings against Edelstein.2
To answer that question, the Court addressed (1) the party-status requirements to pursue
nonjudicial foreclosure in Nevada and (2) whether BNY Mellon met those requirements in the
context of NRS 107.086.
I.

Requirements to pursue nonjudicial foreclosure in Nevada

Edelstein argued that Nevada FMP “requires the beneficiary of a deed of trust to prove to
the homeowner that the beneficiary has a right to foreclose on the property.”
The Court agreed with Edelstein’s argument. The Court noted that because the deed of
trust does not convey title so as to allow the beneficiary to obtain the property without
foreclosure and sale3, in order to pursue nonjudicial foreclosure and sale, “[t]he deed and note
must be held together because the holder of the note is only entitled to repayment, and does not
have the right under the deed to use the property as a means of satisfying repayment.”4
The Court also noted that Nevada FMP requires the trustee to obtain and record a Nevada
FMP certificate before proceeding with the foreclosure.5 In order for the FMP certificate to issue,
the trustee must (1) attend the mediation; (2) mediate in good faith; (3) provide the required
documents; or (4) if attending through a representative, have a person present with authority to
modify the loan or access to such a person. The requirements for Nevada FMP mediation provide
that the requisite documents actually enable a determination both of whether a person with the
required authority over the note is available and of whether the party seeking to foreclose is in
fact the beneficiary of the deed of trust or a representative.6 The Court stated this means the party
seeking to obtain a Nevada FMP certificate must show that it is the proper entity, under the
nonjudicial foreclosure statutes, to proceed against the property.7
II.

BNY Mellon met the requirements to pursue nonjudicial foreclosure.

Edelstein argued that though BNY Mellon produced the necessary documents at the
Nevada FMP mediation, the production was not enough to prove it was the proper entity to
2

There were two further arguments made that the Court did not address: (1) BNY Mellon argued that Edelstein’s
petition was untimely filed, but the Court dismissed this argument due to the date Edelstein actually received the
foreclosure statement; (2) The parties disputed the standard of review and strict vs. substantial compliance with
Nevada FMP, but the Court stated the decisions in Leyva v. Nat’l Default Servicing Corp., 127 Nev. __, 255 P.3d
1275 (2011) and Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 127 Nev. __, 255 P.3d 1281 (2011) resolved those issues.
3
Hamm v. Arrowcreek Homeowners' Ass'n, 124 Nev. 290, 298-99, 183 P.3d 895, 901-02 (2008); Orr v. Ulyatt, 23
Nev. 134, 140, 43 P. 916, 917-18 (1896).
4
Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011).
5
See NEV. REV. STAT. 107.086 (2007).
6
NEV. REV. STAT. 107.086(4) (2007); see Leyva v. Nat’l Default Servicing Corp., 127 Nev. __, 255 P.3d 1275
(2011).
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pursue foreclosure. He claimed that the documents were insufficient to prove a clear chain of the
deed of trust and the note from New American Funding to BNY Mellon. He asserted this was
because MERS was only a nominee and therefore did not have authority to assign an interest in
the deed of trust, so the note and the deed of trust were permanently split. Therefore, BNY
Mellon did not have the capacity to foreclose.
The Court looked at how MERS works, noting that MERS was designed to avoid the
need to record multiple transfers of the deed.8 The Court stated that nothing in Nevada law
prohibited MERS' actions and therefore rejected Edelstein’s argument that MERS did not have
authority to assign an interest in the deed of trust.
The Court examined the two most common approaches to situations involving MERS: the
traditional approach, and the Restatement approach. Under the traditional approach, splitting the
note and the deed of trust is impossible, because the holder of the note always has both the note
and the deed.9 Under the traditional approach, the assignment of the deed alone is a nullity.
Therefore, MERS' assignment of the deed of trust separate from the note would have no force.10
However, the Court stated that following this approach would be inconsistent with its prior
ruling in Leyva, in which the Court explained that “[t]ransfers of deeds of trust and mortgage
notes are distinctly separate.”11 Therefore, the Court declined to follow the traditional approach,
and looked instead to the Restatement route.
Under the Restatement approach, a promissory note and a deed of trust are automatically
transferred together unless the parties agree otherwise.12 This allows for parties to agree to
separate the promissory note and the deed of trust.
In this case, New American Funding was the initial holder of the note, and MERS was
characterized in the deed of trust as a separate corporation that was acting solely as a nominee
for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns. The Court then examined the effect of
designating MERS both as a nominee for New American Funding and its successors and assigns,
and as a beneficiary of the deed of trust.
The Court noted that other jurisdictions have held that MERS designation as nominee is
more than sufficient to create an agency relationship between MERS and the Lender and its
successors.13 The Court agreed with this and held that, in this case, MERS holds an agency
relationship with New American Funding and its successors and assigns with regard to the note.
Pursuant to the express language of the deed of trust, "MERS (as nominee for Lender and
Lender's successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including,
but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to take any action required of
Lender . . . .” Therefore, the Court concluded MERS, as an agent for New American Funding
and its successors and assigns, had authority to transfer the note on behalf of New American
8

Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1039.
In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 516 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274 (1872)).
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Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 619, 623-24 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
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127 Nev. __, __, 255 P.3d 1275, 1279 (2011).
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Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Mortgages § 5.4(a) (1997).
13
In re Tucker, 441 B.R. 638, 645 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2010); In re Martinez, 444 B.R. 192, 205-06 (Bankr. D. Ran.
2011); Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Funding and its successors and assigns.14 The Court also noted that the deed of trust also
expressly designated MERS as the beneficiary.
The Court concluded that although MERS was the proper beneficiary pursuant to the
deed of trust, that designation did not make MERS the holder of the note. The Court agreed with
Edelstein’s contention that designating MERS as the beneficiary "split" the note and the deed of
trust at inception because, as the parties agreed, an entity separate from the original note holder
(New American Funding) was listed as the beneficiary (MERS).15 But, the Court found that this
split was not permanent; rather, it simply prevented enforcement of the deed of trust through
foreclosure unless and until the two documents were ultimately held by the same party.16 The
Court concluded that MERS, as a valid beneficiary, may assign its beneficial interest in the deed
of trust to the holder of the note, at which time the documents are reunified.
Here, BNY Mellon claims that it can enforce the deed of trust because MERS assigned its
beneficial interest in the deed of trust to BNY Mellon. Certified copies of the deed of trust and
the subsequent assignment were produced at the mediation; thus, the Court held BNY Mellon is
entitled to enforce the deed of trust. With respect to the note, MERS also assigned its beneficial
interest in the deed of trust together with the note to BNY Mellon. The Court stated that because
MERS, as agent (nominee) for New American Funding's successors and assigns, could transfer
the note on behalf of the successors and assigns, this action also transferred the note to BNY
Mellon.
Plus, even independently of MERS' assignment, BNY Mellon was entitled to enforce the
note. The Court stated that “a note initially made payable 'to order' can become a bearer
instrument, if it is endorsed in blank” under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 18 Here,
New American Funding, the original lender, endorsed the note to Countrywide Bank, N.A., who
then endorsed the note to Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. Countrywide Home Loans endorsed
the note, in blank, as follows: "Pay to the order of Recourse." Thus, the note was bearer paper,
and if the note is payable to bearer, that “indicates that the person in possession of the promise or
order is entitled to payment.”19 The Court held this to mean that to be entitled to enforce the note,
BNY Mellon would merely have to possess the note.
17

The Court concluded that because ReconTrust, BNY Mellon’s trustee, physically
possessed the note, BNY Mellon, the beneficiary, was entitled to enforce it.20 Because BNY
Mellon was entitled to enforce both the note and the deed of trust, which were reunified, BNY
Mellon demonstrated authority over the note and to foreclose.
14

See generally Leyva, 127 Nev. at __, 255 P.3d at 1279-80.
See generally In re Agard, 444 B.R. 231, 247 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011).
16
Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1039.
17
The Uniform Commercial Code, Article 3, governs transfers of negotiable instruments, like the note. Leyva, 127
Nev. at __, 255 P.3d at 1279.
18
Bank of New York v. Raftogianis, 13 A.3d 435, 439 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2010); see also U.C.C. § 3-205 cmt.
2 (2004).
19
Leyva, 127 Nev. at __, 255 P.3d at 1280 (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. 104.3109(1)(a)) (2007); see also NEV. REV.
STAT. 104.3205(2) (2007).
20
The Court noted that it not consider Edelstein’s argument that ReconTrust, rather than BNY Mellon, was “the
holder and person entitled to enforce” because Edelstein did not raise that argument at the district court level.
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Conclusion
The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of petition for judicial review under the
Nevada FMP. Because the party seeking foreclosure (BNY Mellon) became both the holder of
the promissory note and the beneficiary of the deed of trust, the Court found it had standing to
proceed through the Nevada FMP.

